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This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in 
Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct 
reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad 
sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, 
respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned 
banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues 
to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly 
from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to 
act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-
managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over 
financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to contribute to the study of public sector in Russia using the banking industry 
as a case. While the pervasiveness of the public sector in Russia is broadly recognized, it is not a 
simple task to document it carefully. Clear-cut “black-and-white” distinction between forms of 
ownership (public versus private) does not exist, and we identify fairly many state-influenced 
banks where the government is not a shareholder of record. 
Our motivation is to clarify the allocation of state-owned banks among controlling entities. 
That might add color and detail to the picture of state-banking in Russia and underpin policy 
recommendations. The data sample collected on the basis of our definition of public sector can 
be used for subsequent empirical research. 
A few papers dedicated to state-banking in Russia and its effects have emerged since 2007. 
Babayev [2007], Glushkova and Vernikov [2009] and Vernikov [2009] discuss key definitions 
related to state banking, try to develop a comprehensive classification of public banks and to 
assess the size of public sector in terms of its market share of total bank assets. 
Empirical research has already started covering selected aspects of state banking in Russia. 
Karas et al. [2008] find – surprisingly – that in Russia domestic public banks are no less efficient 
than private banks. Fungáčová and Poghosyan [2009] analyze interest margin determinants with 
a particular emphasis on the bank ownership structure and argue that state-controlled banks do 
not seem to take credit risk into account in their pricing strategy. Fungáčová et al. [2010] look 
into bank competition in Russia by measuring the market power and its determinants over the 
period 2001-2007 and find no greater market power for state-controlled banks. Glushkova [2010] 
makes a very preliminary empirical assessment of behavior patterns and relative performance of 
state-owned banks vis-à-vis other groups of market participants. She finds that banks directly 
owned by state authorities display lower profit efficiency than private institutions, whereas banks 
indirectly owned by the state behave more or less like their private peers. 
In this paper we collect bank-level statistics to reveal changes in the ownership structure of 
the banking industry and the techniques of ownership control. These issues are relevant for 
studies of comparative efficiency and performance of institutions with different ownership types. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces key definitions 
and a classification of state-influenced banks. Section 3 assesses the size of public sector and its 
main components. Section 4 addresses the interplay between ownership and control in indirectly 
state-owned banks. Section 5 suggests an outlook, and Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Public sector in Russian banking: Scope, definitions and classification 
The main criterion of classifying a bank is the degree of control over its decision-making and 
lending policy by state authorities and managers in charge of public capital. Control can be 
exercised via equity ownership, via governance, or otherwise. We depict diverse forms of 
interaction between banks and the authorities in a classification scheme (Fig.1).  
Figure 1. Classification of state-influenced banks 
 
* At least 50% of equity originates from public funds 
Group 1.1 - state-owned banks (hereinafter SOBs), or government-owned banks, or public 
banks, represents the center-piece of the suggested classification of state-influenced banks. SOB 
is a bank with state ownership exceeding 50%. In the literature one comes across more liberal 
criteria: La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer would recognize a bank as “government-
owned” if government holds at least 20% of equity but acts as the single largest shareholder [La 
Porta et al., 2002]. We define the category of state-controlled banks (group 1) more broadly than 
just SOBs to include as well banks that are governed by the state or its bodies in the absence of 
majority equity participation (state-governed banks – subgroup 1.2).  
Banks in subgroup 1.1.1 are directly state-owned  in the sense that that their major or sole 
shareholder is an executive body at the federal, regional or municipal level, or a CBR. Strictly 
speaking, however, Russian law provides three forms of ownership (public, municipal, and 
private ownership), so municipal property is not the same as state property. Banks in subgroup 
1.1.2 are indirectly state-owned, because they are mostly capitalized by funds of public origin 
and do not belong directly to state authorities. We refer here to banks over 50% of whose equity 
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belongs to companies and banks that are fully public property or have mixed public/private 
capital with prevalence of public funds.  
The legal status of bank equity belonging to SOEs and SOBs remains blurred. There is no 
universally recognized methodology for classifying bank shares and participations as public or 
private, especially with regard to downstream holdings. Absence of the state (understood as 
federal-level authorities) among bank shareholders of record provides a formal basis for treating 
such a bank as private property. Commonsense would suggest that predominantly public origin 
of funds at the top-level company must reproduce the same form of ownership downstream. 
Therefore a bank even at the bottom of the corporate control pyramid should also be regarded as 
public property. Not so in Russia. According to Law on Privatization and other pieces of 
legislation, public property invested in a subsidiary company or bank stops being public. A 
subsidiary bank of SOE is nominally private even if in essence it is not. From this viewpoint, for 
example, VTB24, the retail banking subsidiary of VTB bank, does not belong to state property 
and is a joint-stock company whose shares belong to another joint-stock company. 
State control over a bank’s activity can as well exist in the absence of majority equity 
participation. Absolute majority of “state-governed banks” (subgroup 1.2 “state-governed banks” 
in the classification depicted in Fig.1) are the failed financial institutions now run by the Deposit 
Insurance Agency (ASV). 
Regardless of legal formalities, broad public often refers to indirectly SOBs as “quasi-state 
banks”, i.e. para-statals. We do not think it is correct. A quasi-state bank is actually one that is 
broadly perceived as a SOB while not being one, so this term would for example fit VTB24 that 
technically does not belong to the state. Conversely, banks that are nominally private JSCs but 
are funded with public resources we prefer to call “quasi-private”.   
In order to develop a sample of SOBs, we screened individual banks for presence of public 
sector institutions among listed shareholders. No official publication contains data broken down 
by form of property in a way acceptable to us from a substantive viewpoint. Information sources 
included statutory disclosure by banks and their parent companies, annual and quarterly reports, 
CBR publications and website. Statistical data were borrowed from Interfax quarterly database 
of Russian banks, RBK rankings, and bank web-sites. By January 2010 our sample of state-
owned banks consisted of 50 institutions (Table 1). Out of this number, 16 banks are state-
owned in the legally strict sense: 4 of them are fully or majority owned by federal level 
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authorities (federal government and the Central Bank of Russia) and 12 by regional authorities3. 
Three banks belong to municipal authorities4.  
Table 1. Breakdown of state-owned banks 
Number of banks 
01.01.2001 01.01.2010 
Federal executive authorities and the CBR 6 4 
Regional authorities and federal city governments 10 12 
Municipal authorities 1 3 
State-owned companies, state-owned banks and “state corporations” 19 31 
Total 36 50 
Source: Author’s estimate based on bank data 
The remaining 31 banks in the sample we regard as indirectly state-owned because they are 
controlled by public sector entities and not the federal government itself. Funds of public origin 
have been invested in subsidiary bank equity by state-owned enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) such 
as Gazprom, Rosneft, Russian Railways, and Alrosa, by a SOB (VTB) and by 2 of the “state 
corporations”5 (ASV, the Deposit Insurance Agency, and Vneshekonombank, the Bank for 
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs). Some of indirectly SOBs (Gazprombank, 
TransKreditBank, VBRR, Bank Moskvy etc.) in their turn own stakes in other commercial banks. 
Full sample of SOBs is specified in [Vernikov, 2009b]. Constructing a data sample of state-
owned banks is a continuous process. Since the release of our previous studies in November-
December 2009 [Vernikov, 2009a; 2009b] some banks have changed hands, fell under state 
control or were divested from by state-owned companies.  
                                                            
3 Governments of relatively affluent regions like Khanty-Mansiysk, Tatarstan, Sverdlovsk, Krasnodar, 
Orenburg and the city of Moscow are majority owners of commercial banks. Some other regions and 
municipalities launched their banks too but could not sustain them. 
4 The number of banks controlled by municipal authorities is certainly greater, but so far we have not 
been able to document. These banks are usually small in size, so their omission does not affect the 
accuracy of our estimates.  
5  ASV and VEB have legal status of “State Corporation” that is neither a joint-stock company nor 
executive agency nor part of the Russian federal government. Each of them is governed by an individual 
federal law. We put the legal status in quotation marks because “state corporations” are not really 
corporations in the conventional sense but not-for-profit entities. 
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3. The growing share of indirectly state-owned banks 
During the decade of 2000s, state-owned banks have increased their combined assets to RUB 
15.8 trillion (Fig.2). Public sector grew organically due to the greater dynamism of state-owned 
banks, as well as via takeovers of failed private banks. First takeovers were unrelated to the 2008 
financial crisis. Vneshtorgbank (now VTB) used public funds to take over the failed Guta-Bank 
in 2004 and the viable Promstroybank in 2005. Guta-Bank was transformed into VTB fully-
owned subsidiary under the brand of VTB24. The 2008 crisis greatly accelerated transfer of 
formerly private banks under state control. 
Figure 2. Growth of Russian bank assets, RUB trillions 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from CBR, RBK and Interfax 
The combined market share of state-owned banks6 reached its bottom of 30% or so in 1998 
and then started to grow again. The recent financial crisis of 2008-9 catalyzed the process but 
certainly did not originate it. Over 2001-10 there was not even a single year-on-year decrease of 
state-owned banks’ market share (Fig. 3), and by January 2010 it reached 53.7%. There are 
alternative estimates of the same indicator (Table 2). Central Bank of Russia experts put the 
share of total assets held by state-controlled banks7 at 40.6%, which is fairly close to our 
estimate under a narrow definition of state property (federal and regional authorities only). The 
gap of 12 percentage points between the CBR figure and our broad estimate is attributed to 
                                                            
6 We define market share as the percentage of total banking assets held by state-owned banks. When state 
participation exceeds 50%, the bank’s assets are counted fully at 100%. Banks with minority state 
participation were not included. For further detail see [Vernikov, 2009b]. 
7 CBR experts use the term “state-controlled banks” in their analytical reports without specifying which 
exactly banks are meant [CBR, 2009, pp.18, 20, 24]. As far as we can judge by the statistical indicators 
provided, CBR experts stick to a rather narrow definition of “state” that comprises banks belonging to 
federal and regional executive authorities. 
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difference in coverage, namely (non-) inclusion of indirectly-owned banks such as the offspring 
of SOEs, SOBs and “state corporations”. 
Figure 3. Market share of state-owned banks (% of total assets)  
 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from CBR, RBK and Interfax 
Table 2. Market share of public banks in Russia, January 1, 2009 
Author / source Indicator 
Market share, % 
of total assets 
EBRD, 2009 “state-owned banks” 37.5 
CBR, 2009 “state-controlled banks” 40.6 
Raiffeisenbank, 2009 “state-owned banks” 45.7 
author’s calculation “state-owned banks”, narrow definition 39.5 
author’s calculation “state-owned banks”, broad definition 52.8 
author’s calculation* “state-owned banks”, narrow definition 40.5* 
author’s calculation* “state-owned banks”, broad definition 53.7* 
* January 1, 2010 
 
We deem it essential to distinguish two main components within public sector, namely 
directly-SOBs and indirectly-SOBs. Figures 4 and 5 and Annex Table 4 display the main trends 
in assets growth and market share dynamics of individual categories of banks.  
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Figure 4. Growth of state-owned banks’ assets (RUB trillions) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from CBR, RBK and Interfax 
Figure 5. Market share of different types of state-owned banks (% of total bank assets in 
Russia) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from CBR, RBK and Interfax 
Among the 4 banks directly controlled by federal-level authorities, three are very large 
(Sberbank, VTB and Rosselkhozbank). It is the assets of these “national champions” that drove 
upwards the share of directly-owned banks in Russia’s total from 29.7% to 36.3%. The shares of 
banks controlled by regional and municipal authorities did not change much. The fastest-growing 
category was, however, the banks owned by public sector companies and banks. Their number 
grew from 19 to 31, and their share of total bank assets jumped from 4.0% to 13.1%. This led to 
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a visible restructuring within the public sector, and contribution of indirectly state-owned banks 
has exceeded 25% (Fig.6). 
Fig. 6. The growing share of indirectly state-owned banks (% of total assets of public banks) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from CBR, RBK and Interfax. 
 All previous tables and figures use data referring to aggregate categories of banks 
depending on type of ownership. But composition of data sample has not been stable because 
banks have migrated from one category to another8. The burgeoning of the group of banks 
owned by SOEs, SOBs and “state corporations” took place since the 2H2008 only. Hence for 
empirical purposes a new stable data sample needs to be constructed. We left only banks that 
throughout the entire period of observations (1Q2001 through 4Q2009) remained in the same 
category of public ownership. Description of the new sample is in Table 3. A stable data set 
loses numerically as compared to the original sample (coverage of 54%) but retains satisfactory 
representativeness in terms of combined market share of banks in the sample (87.2% of the full 
original sample).  
 
                                                            
8 For instance, in 2007 the government transferred two of its banks (Rossiyskiy bank razvitiya, reg.#3340 
and Roseximbank, reg.#3340) from federal ownership into the property of VEB, a “state corporation”. In 
the second half of 2009 the Republic of Tatarstan injected funds into equity of Ak Bars Bank to become 
its core shareholder, so we reclassified Ak Bars Bank from subgroup 1.2 (state-governed) to subgroup 
1.1.1 (bank owned or controlled by regional authorities). 
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Table 3. Description of stable data sample of public banks for empirical research  
New sample: indicator 
As % of the full sample, January 1, 2010 
Number of banks Market share 
Federal-owned banks (3) 75% 100% 
Regional-owned banks (9) 75% 77.6% 
Municipal-owned banks (0) 0% 0% 
Banks owned by SOEs and SOBs (15) 48.4% 55.2% 
Total (27) 54.0% 87.2% 
Analysis of the stable sample reveals that SOBs have grown faster than the remaining 
Russian market players, and among SOBs the indirectly-owned banks have grown faster than 
others categories – federal-owned and regional-owned banks (Fig.7). Whether SOBs have 
outperformed other Russian banks in terms of efficiency remains a question on our research 
agenda. Glushkova [2010] makes a very preliminary empirical assessment of behavior patterns 
and relative performance of SOBs vis-à-vis other groups of market participants. She finds that 
banks directly owned by state authorities do display lower profit efficiency than private 
institutions, whereas banks indirectly owned by the state behave more or less like their private 
peers.  
Figure 7. Indirectly state-owned banks grow fastest (bank assets on January 1, 2001 = 100) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from CBR, RBK and Interfax 
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4. Interplay between ownership and control 
We argued in the previous section that the importance of indirectly SOBs has consistently grown 
over the decade of 2000s. Indirect public ownership represents a fairly flexible arrangement 
beneficial for all parties involved. For government authorities themselves, indirect ownership 
might be convenient from political and propagandistic points of view as it conceals the true 
magnitude of public sector and allows promoting Russia’s image of a “normal market economy”.  
Banks directly owned by the state are bound by government rules and regulations. 
Authorities appoint delegates to the board of directors, and those delegates have to vote 
according to government orders and guidelines. Indirect form of ownership helps to overcome 
bureaucratic hurdles related to management of public assets and disposition of them and implies 
lesser accountability. By migrating from direct to indirect public ownership bank insiders 
unwilling to perform one of the specific roles expected from a SOB9 may distance from the state 
authorities.  
This might be one possible explanation to the trend of banks migrating from direct to 
indirect public ownership. Moscow city government used to control Bank Moskvy, Russia’s 5th 
largest financial institution, from the bank’s inception in 1995, but at a certain point direct 
control slipped away from the government through a chain of apparently legitimate corporate 
actions. Now the Moscow city government owns directly just 48.11% percent of equity; another 
15.28% belongs to Stolichnaya strakhovaya gruppa. The latter is an insurance company 
affiliated with the Moscow city government and co-owned by the government and Bank Moskvy. 
As for control, Bank Moskvy might be under decisive influence of its CEO and a few persons 
close to the Moscow city government. 
Dilution of  corporate  control  is more common yet  in  indirectly SOBs.  Gazprombank, Russia’s 
3rd largest bank initially was under control of Gazprom, but by now Gazprom’s stake has fallen 
below the level of direct control (41.73% of shares). Instead the bank’s majority shareholder of 
record with 50% plus one share is now Gazfond, the Gazprom’s pension fund; another 6.98% of 
shares belong to “OOO Novfintekh”, Gazprombank’s own subsidiary company. Who actually 
                                                            
9 Core SOBs have preferential access to public funds and enjoy a variety of other privileges, but have to 
perform special functions in addition to those routinely performed by all commercial banks, i.a.: (a) to 
allocate liquidity obtained from Finance Ministry and CBR among banks in the lower tier; (b) to acquire 
and hold non-core industrial assets deemed as strategic by state authorities; (c) to make long-term 
investment available to “systemically-important” enterprises and “strategic projects”, including those with 
a social or political dimension like sport or congress facilities; (d) to provide first-aid funds to companies 
and regions hit by natural or technological disasters. 
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controls indirectly state-owned banks? In the case of Gazprombank, it is no longer its parent 
company (OAO Gazprom) or the government. The bank might be influenced by St.-Petersburg-
based shareholders of Bank Rossiya who act through Lider management company that manages 
the assets of Gazfond, the bank’s core shareholder of record. 
We note two particular features inherent to indirectly SOBs: (a) public sector entities recur 
to circular ownership and control structures (Bank Moskvy and Stolichnaya strakhovaya gruppa 
own each other’s shares, and so do Gazprombank and Novfintekh); and (b) Moscow city 
government can exercise full control over Bank Moskvy, but legally it is a minority shareholder. 
Mutual ownership of shares was, and still is, broadly used in the private sector as a defense 
instrument against corporate raiders. Its usage in a public bank may mean that its affiliated 
persons do not fully trust existing mechanisms of ownership protection and, just in case, prefer to 
put in place additional defense against a possible suitor, including the state itself.  
Indirect ownership is often organized through several levels, or tiers, of corporate control 
between a bank and its ultimate beneficiary owner. Indeed, we find growing evidence of multi-
level holding structures with a large SOE or SOB at the top of the pyramid. In the corporate 
pyramid we see up to five intermediate ownership levels between a government entity and the 
equity stake in a downstream commercial bank. Each superior entity holds a controlling stake in 
the lower-level entity. We refer to two pieces of evidence, one related to holding structure within 
Gazprom group (Annex Fig.8) and the other to Russian Railways, the state-owned transportation 
monopoly (Annex Fig.9). Russian Railways JSC owns TransKreditBank that in turn owns five 
subsidiary banks. In a more complicated fashion, the Russian state controls Gazprom, one of 
whose divisions (Mezhregiongaz) owns Gazenergoprombank, that took over Sobinbank, that had 
been in control of Russky ipotechny bank (until April 2009).  
Corporate pyramids enable separation between ownership and control. Under normal 
circumstances ownership title should give control rights. But state bodies do not hold ownership 
title for a stake in indirectly owned banks. The state only has authority over corporate decisions 
of the company one level down but not of the downstream companies. Nominally the SOE/SOE 
on top of the pyramid can act through management bodies (board of directors, CEO and/or 
executive board) of the subsidiary bank that can theoretically project the influence and will of the 
top institution further down the chain. But with each additional tier of the corporate pyramid 
public control and scrutiny over the use of public funds gets weaker. There is however no reason 
to argue that downstream banks have escaped from the control of the SOE on top of the 
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corporate pyramid, rather that control mechanism has become less formal and transparent. When 
necessary, this control chain works well. When insiders find it less beneficial for them, the 
machine comes to a halt, and simplest corporate actions can be take a long time. 
The use of multi-level holding structures often signals entrenchment of the blockholder 
against outside shareholders10. The blockholder might be the government or the top management 
of SOEs or SOBs. Entrenchment is a way to leave without leaving, i.e. to maintain leverage over 
the company after the state formally divests from it partly or fully.  
Indirect state ownership creates fertile ground for all kinds of opportunistic behavior by 
bank insiders including top-managers, current and former civil servants, and cronies. For all 
practical purposes, influential insiders (bank top managers, board members and the public 
officials who represent the authorities) run indirectly state-owned banks as if it were their own 
private property. Dilution of property by insiders and tacit appropriation of parts of bank equity 
are not uncommon. Some of the large banks that are universally perceived as state-controlled 
banks technically are not.  
Delegation of owner rights by executive authorities to related companies was already 
widespread by the start of this decade, but the 2008 financial crisis gave it a powerful boost. 
When banks started collapsing in autumn 2008 and for a combination of reasons their 
nationalization became imminent, none of them was taken over in a straightforward way by 
federal executive authorities. In each case an individual scenario was selected, involving one or 
another entity to act on behalf of the state. The most common case was delegation of rescuer 
functions to the deposit insurance agency (ASV) that prior to the crisis did not have such 
authority. ASV presided over rehabilitation of 19 banks and received back-up funding of RUB 
200 billion from the budget. In a similar fashion VEB – Development Bank, another “state 
corporation”, received public funding for a bail out of Svyaz-Bank and Globex Bank. A USD 2.5 
billion deposit from CBR allowed VEB to extend RUB 90 billion for recapitalization of Svyaz-
Bank. There were also cases when rescue and rehabilitation of failed banks was entrusted to 
public sector companies. Russian Railways and Alrosa (diamond-mining company) received a 
mandate for bail-out of KIT-Finans investment bank (Alrosa later quit the project). 
Gazenergoprombank (an offspring of Gazprom) was brought into the rescue of Sobinbank and 
Bank Soyuz. Khanty-Mansiysky Bank took over Novosibirsky municipalny bank. 
                                                            
10 A blockholder would entrench against outside shareholders [Morck, Steier, 2005].  
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There is no proof that asset quality in SOBs is radically higher than in other Russian banks. 
Nevertheless SOBs were not allowed to fail during the crisis of 2008. The state remains liable for 
those banks, even if unknowingly and unwillingly.  
5. What next?  
The outlook embraces two trends with regard to governance structure in the public sector.  
On the one hand, we expect indirect public ownership to expand organically (through 
faster growth of more flexible quasi-private banks) and through takeovers of failed private banks 
by SOEs and SOBs.  
On the other hand, the state may divest from some of the banks it had to bail out and take 
over during the financial crisis of 2008-9. We anticipate state withdrawal initiatives to develop 
under the aegis of “privatization” and “replenishing budgetary funds”. In the process of state 
withdrawal insiders will benefit. We already witness signals that the state would like to merge or 
sell some of the banks in order to eliminate duplication and to overcome managerial capability 
constraint in the public sector. VEB – Development Bank is looking for a strategic investment 
partner to launch Post Bank on the platform of Svyaz-Bank that it currently controls. It might also 
consider selling Globex-Bank into which RUB 80 billion of public funds have already been sunk. 
After being rescued at public expense, Bank Soyuz will sell at significantly lower price one-half 
of its equity to Ingosstrakh insurance company belonging to the same beneficiary owner as 
before.  
For a better understanding of “privatization” prospects, a brief reference to the history of 
bank “privatization” in Russia is relevant. State withdrawal from the commercial banking sector 
in the 1990s was quite messy. Schoors [2000] cites a CBR source suggesting that at the 
beginning of 1994, 609 banks, or 29.8% of the 2,041 registered banks were actually successors 
of the former Soviet system of State Bank and its affiliated “specialized banks”, or spetsbanki 
(Promstroybank, Zhilsotsbank, Agroprombank and Vneshekonombank). Of these 609 banks, 
42.7% were off-shoots from Agroprombank, 28.2% from Promstroybank and 20.2% from 
Zhilsotsbank. These banks are the successors of a branch, a local department, a regional 
department or a sectoral department of one of the specialized state banks. Schoors refers to all 
these banks as “former state banks” and describes their inception in 1990-92 as “decentralized 
spontaneous privatization”. Spontaneous indeed it was. Bank top managers and other insiders 
tacitly appropriated of substantial banking assets and the physical infrastructure held by 
hundreds of spetsbanki branches; they would steal whatever they could touch upon. The state got 
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practically no compensation from the “spontaneous privatization”. Sberbank (the savings bank) 
network was the least affected by the tide of property grabbing. Ironically, a large proportion of 
the “former state banks” did not survive the series of bank crises of 1995, 1998-99, 2004 and 
2008-09, due to mismanagement, incompetence, fraud, asset stripping etc. 
We see no reason why a new wave of “privatization” should be cardinally different in 
essence, or yield significantly better results for the country. We are already starting to see signs 
of the next wave of crony privatization when insiders try to appropriate parts of equity at 
indirectly SOBs. In 2009 the supervisory board of VTB bank authorized a management buy-out 
of a blocking stake at its Cyprus subsidiary, Russian Commercial Bank, as presumably 
unprofitable non-core asset. The price paid to VTB for the stock turned out to be lower than the 
intermediate dividend for 2H 2009 that new stockholders received shortly after the transaction. 
Following huge injections of public funds over 2008-2009 (Sberbank alone received a 
subordinated loan of RUB 500 billion) the management of both largest banks, Sberbank and 
VTB, proposed to the government privatizing the banks and launching option schemes to provide 
additional incentive for the management. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
State-owned banks exist in many countries of the world, and financial crisis led to bank 
nationalizations in quite a few countries including United Kingdom. What singles out Russia, 
however, is the sheer scale of state ownership of banks and the governance structure. It is 
unusual to move strategic assets from direct control of government agencies into the hands of 
public sector managers at SOEs. Corporate pyramids conceived by taxpayers’ money are a 
bizarre feature even by emerging market standards.  
We detected two new trends: (a) delegation of bank owner’s rights from government 
authorities to SOEs, SOBs and ‘state corporations’; (b) multi-level structures of corporate 
ownership over banks, as part of the ‘entrenchment’ of the state and/or other insiders against 
external shareholders. Our hypothesis is that indirect control is an essential component of the 
new paradigm of state participation in the financial system.  
Our study suggests that along with 16 commercial banks fully or majority-owned by 
federal and regional authorities there are at least 31 banks that we qualify as indirectly state-
owned. Nominally private joint-stock companies, those banks have equity that can be traced 
back to originally public funds invested by the state into a SOE. Indirectly-state-owned banks 
now command slightly over one-quarter of all public sector bank assets and 13 percent of 
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Russia’s total bank assets. Direct public ownership of banks is gradually giving way to indirect 
ownership and control. This phenomenon cannot be deemed coincidental and deserves close 
attention. 
Ownership is not fully equivalent to control, and state authorities usually cannot project 
substantial influence on corporate decisions of indirectly-owned banks. The banks are held by 
insiders including top-managers, current and former civil servants and their cronies. Insiders 
extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank 
equity. 
Indirect public ownership gives flexibility and broadens the discretion of bank insiders, but 
for the state as a whole it is a suboptimal arrangement. Here ownership does not necessarily 
entitle control. For the state owning banks via SOEs and SOBs, and not directly, makes little 
financial sense. Indirect public ownership is neither efficient nor transparent. The state benefits 
little from those banks in terms of dividend flow, capitalization or policy lending. It continues to 
bear ultimate financial responsibility for survival and viability of indirectly owned banks and 
carries associated risks, while benefits are usurped by individual insiders.  
The policy implication from our study is as follows. If the state cannot effectively control 
those banks and cannot make good use of them, it should impede public funds being invested in 
them. We would envisage a program aimed at removing bank equity stakes from SOEs and 
SOBs and transferring these stakes to the federal (which is preferable) and regional level of 
government, similarly to what happened to the equity stakes previously held by GUPs (state 
unitary enterprises) after such holdings were banned by law. It must be ruled out for SOEs and 
SOBs to establish their own “subsidiary” banks directly or via intermediate corporate vehicles, 
and existing corporate pyramids in the public sector must be dismantled. Instead a state bank 
holding could be set up to own and dispose of bank equity participations. This would render 
transparency and efficiency to the management of public funds and in future facilitate genuine 
privatizations, as different from fake privatizations and mere appropriation by insiders that 
constitute baseline scenario. 
As for directions for future research, we would mention:  
• testing empirically whether indirectly SOBs perform better than directly SOBs and than 
domestic private banks; 
• describing patterns of opportunistic behavior of public bank insiders; and 
• developing methodology to assess the effect from state ownership on banks on a macro level. 
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Annex. 
 
Table 4. Market share of state-owned banks* by subgroups, % of Russia’s total banking 
assets at start of period 
 
Banks controlled by 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Federal executive 
authorities and the CBR 29.7 30.8 31.9 32.2 30.7 33.0 32.1 33.6 36.0 36.3 
Regional authorities**  2.2 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.5 4.2 
Sub-total: State-owned 
banks according to 
narrow definition 
31.9 33.0 34.4 34.5 33.2 35.9 35.3 36.7 39.5 40.5 
Municipal authorities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
State-owned companies, 
state-owned banks and 
“state corporations” 
4.0 4.1 4.6 5.0 7.6 7.5 8.4 8.1 13.2 13.1 
Total: State-owned banks 
according to broad 
definition 
35.9 37.1 39.1 39.7 40.8 43.5 43.7 44.9 52.8 53.7 
* A list of state-owned banks can be found in [Vernikov, 2009b]; ** Including government of federal 
cities 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from [CBR, 2009], [Interfax, 2010], [RBC, 2009], and bank 
data. 
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Figure 8. Control structure in Gazprom group 
 
Source: Bank data; corporate disclosure. 
Figure 9. Control structure in Russian Railways group 
 
Source: Bank data; corporate disclosure 
 
 
